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THE  STRATEGIC  ROLE  OF  SUPERMARKET  BUYER  INTERMEDIARIES 
IN  NEW  PRODUCT  SELECTION:  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  SYSTEMWIDE  EFFICIENCY 
Although  the management  and  organizational  theory  I iterature  is 
rich  in  its treatment of  internal  firm  behavior,  relatively  I ittle of 
this work  has  penetrated mainstream  economic  analysis.  This situation 
IS  part of  the general  neglect by  economists  and  agricultural  economists 
of  management  strategy and  conduct as  pointed out  by  Marion, 
Leibenstein,  Shaffer among  others.  To  the ext6nt that economic  behavior 
has  been  studied,  however,  it has  been  through  the work  of  industrial 
organization  (10)  economists  and,  specifically,  their work  with  the 
structure-conduct-performance  (S-C-P)  paradigm  (e.g.,  Scherer). 
However,  Henderson  and  Marion  have  noted  that 10  theory  rarely 
explicitly considers the firm  decision  environment,  neither at 
manufacturer  or distributor  levels.  Recently,  several  researchers 
(e.g.,  Westgren  and  Cook,  Rogers  and  Caswel I)  have  identified  internal 
firm  decision-making  and  strategic behavior  as a  high  priority  research 
area.  Ultimately,  if  improvements  in  systemwide  efficiency are to  be 
achieved,  a  better understanding of  internal  firm  decision making  is 
required. 
THE  RESEARCH  CONTEXT 
Increase  in  new  grocery  product  introductions  (alternatively, 
product prol iferation)  represents a  economic  phenomenon  where  a  better 
understanding  of  firm  behavior  (conduct)  is essential  to  improving 
systemwide  efficiency.  Indeed,  product proliferation  has  been  widely 
cited as one  of  the major  modes  of  competitive conduct  by  leading 2 
grocery  manufacturers  (Padberg  and  Westgren,  Connor,  Zellner).  In  1988, 
estimates of  the number  of  new  products,  including  both  fundamentally 
new  products derived  from  new  technologies and  line extensions  (e.g., 
new  flavors or  package  sizes)  ranged  as  high  as 10,558  (Gorman).  This 
number  is more  than  twice the 1970-81  annual  average  (Gorman).  The 
resources  required  to support this yearly  influx of  new  products are 
enormous  for  the entire grocery  system.  Although  aggregate data  on 
costs of  new  product  introductions are not avai lable,  selected 
references  on  individual  product  introductions suggest that  industry-
wide  totals are staggering.  Fortune,  for  example,  reports a  total 
development  expenditure of  $1.5  bi I lion  by  the Proctor  and  Gamble 
Company  to  introduce a  single product,  its Ultra-Pamper  diaper,  to U.S. 
supermarkets;  $1  bi I I ion  of this was  spent on  advertising alone. 
Although  overal I  retai I  store sizes have  continued to grow,  the 
relative space  al located  to dry  groceries  has  been  constant or  decl ining 
over  the  last five years  (Progressive Grocer,  October  1987).  Wholesale 
and  retai I  companies  simply  do  not  have  physical  or financial  capacity 
to accommodate  al I  of  the  new  products,  so choices  have  to be  made. 
Because  many  products,  probably  the majority -(Progressive Grocer, 
November  1987),  do  not gain entry  into the supermarket system,  large 
economic  losses are  incurred  by  manufacturers as wei I  as  intermediary 
firms. 
To  maximize  both distributive efficiency and  the probabi lity of  new 
product acceptance,  manufacturers  require an  intimate knowledge  of 
buyers'  behavior,  not just at consumer  levels but at the pivotal  channel 
intermediary  (i .e.,  supermarket  buyer)  levels as  wei I.  Economic  theory 
suggests that manufacturers  should  make  al locations of  a  predetermined 3 
budget for  a  new  product to various components  of  the  new  product's 
marketing  plan  to equal ize marginal  returns.  To  exercise this 
optimality criterion,  manufacturers  need  better  information  regarding 
the characteristics of  new  products that are most  important to  buyers  In 
their accept/reject decisions.  Further,  information  is  needed  on  those 
characteristics of  products that are  likely to assure consumer 
acceptance  in  the marketplace. 
Against this background,  this paper  develops  logistic  regression 
models  to formalize the channel  intermediary's conduct and  decision 
processes  regarding  new  product  introductions  by  manufacturers.  The 
effects of  various components  of  manufacturers'  conduct  (e.g.,  marketing 
strategies)  on  new  product selection decisions are estimated.  Further, 
the status of  accepted  new  products after a  period  of  time  was  also 
examined  to understand  the differences between  the  intermediary's 
acceptance and  marketplace acceptance.  The  impl ications of  these 
analyses for  systemwide  efficiency are discussed. 
LITERATURE  REVIEW 
Past research of  new  product  introductions may  be  separated  into 
those with  a  publ ic  policy orientation and  those with  a  managerial 
perspective.  In the former  group,  the common  conceptual  theme  has  been 
the S-C-P  paradigm  using secondary  sources of data.  Some  relevant 
studies  in  this stream are those  by  Adams  and  Vel ler,  who  studied the 
simi larity of  new  products,  Schmalensee,  who  identified  new  product 
proliferation as an  explicit manufacturer  strategy to erect entry 
barriers and  Scherer,  who  estimated the welfare effects of  new  product 
introductions.  Conner  has  investigated  relationships between 4 
manufacturer  market structure and  the number  of  new  products  (for 
elaboration of  these studies,  see Conner  et al .).  As  in  much  of  the 
structure-performance  I iterature,  the emphasis  on  the conduct dimension 
in  these studies,  especially of  the  intermediary-buyer,  is minimal. 
However,  there  is a  valuable strain of  literature that examines  new 
product acceptance from  a  strategic managerial  perspective.  Grashof, 
for  example,  found  that product  newness  turned  out to be  the most 
important criterion  in  a  single product category,  dog  food,  when 
attempting to evaluate hypothetical  performance outcomes.  Heeler et al. 
in  studying a  limited  data  base,  concluded  that the procurement  function 
could  be  made  more  efficient by  simply  eliminating those products that 
did  not  even  merit marginal  evaluation.  Montgomery  modeled  buyer 
reaction to  hypotheti'cal  products and  whi  Ie  certain of  his findings  were 
consistent with  a  priori  expectations--e.g.,  advertising support was  a 
significant predictor of  product acceptabi lity--he pointed  to the 
cumbersome  nature of  his analytical  models  for  larger data sets. 
Thus,  past efforts to evaluate  new  product  introductions  have 
relied either on  secondary  data  involving  limited  numbers  of  categories, 
simulated experiments,  strictly theoretical  approaches,  or  buyer 
reaction to  hypothetical  products.  Only  modest  attempts  have  been  made 
to  investigate the  intermediary conduct of  the supermarket  headquarters 
buyer.  Yet  the strategic decisions made  by  this  link  between 
manufacturer  and  consumer  are key  to developing total  system efficiency 
improvement.  Finally,  the most  recent empirical  studies  (Scherer and 
Connor)  were  both  conducted  on  data  collected from  the 1970s.  Given  the 
surge of  new  products over  the past decade  and  their  increasing economic 5 
importance,  research  on  this  important strategic activity  using  primary 
data  is required. 
BUYER-SELLER  CONDUCT 
Although  various typologies of  new  products  may  be  cited  (e.g. , 
Connor),  new  products  in  this paper  refer to al I  items  new  to the 
channel  intermediary  including  new  flavors,  new  sizes and  new  brands. 
National  brand  manufacturers cite a  number  of  reasons to justify the 
proliferation of  new  products  including:  to maintain  interest of 
channel  intermediaries and  consumers,  to extend  an  item  to an  adjacent 
product-space  in  an  effort to attract  incremental  business,  to take 
advantage of  new  technologies and  changes  in  consumer  demand,  to counter 
competitive thrusts or to  pre-empt competition,  to transform  a  commodity 
to a  higher  margin  value-added  item,  and  to partially ensure against 
high  new  product fai lure  rates. 
Despite the key  role played  by  new  products  in  manufacturer 
marketing strategies,  their prol iferation  imposes  considerable costs  on 
other channel  members  (e.g.,  wholesalers  and  retai lers)  and  consumers . 
Retai I  organizations,  for  example,  although  often attracted to  new 
products  by  the  lure of  additional  profit opportunities,  must  also face 
substantial  costs associated  with  new  products such  as  personnel  costs 
in  evaluating  new  products  (Hamm) ,  costs of  entry  and  maintenance of  new 
data,  and  other costs associated  with  inventory control  and  handl ing, 
special ized  wholesale and  retai I  space  requirements,  and  production  of 
shelf signs.  Finally,  new  products  impose  substantial  direct and 
indirect costs on  consumers.  These  latter costs come  in  the form  of 
higher  search  and  information  processing costs  (e.g.,  potential 6 
confusion  regarding  new  products'  characteristics and  avai labi lity)  and 
higher  prices. 
The  above  discussion  points to the  importance  of  the channel 
intermediary's decision making  process to the performance of  the total 
grocery  system.  Yet  past  research  has  not shed  much  light on  whether, 
or  in  what  ways,  the  intermediary's  role enhances efficiency or  inhibits 
it.  As  manufacturers  develop  new  products at a  more  rapid  rate than 
intermediaries can  accommodate  them,  neoclassical  notions of  consumer 
sovereignty  initiating efficient  decisi~ns may  break  down  if the 
intermediary  becomes  the arbitor of  consumer  choice.  Moreover,  it 
appears  possible that manufacturer  inducements,  such  as couponing, 
bi I ling allowances  and  free goods,  are more  important to the buyer  than 
inherent product qual ity.  These  proposit~ons are critical  to grocery 
system  resource al location  and  efficiency. 
THE  SUPERMARKET  INTERMEDIARY'S  INITIAL  ACCEPTANCE  MODEL 
The  conceptual  model  guiding  our  analysis of  the behavior  of  the 
supermarket buyer  to accept or  reject a  new  product  is presented  in 
Figure 1.  This  approach  elaborates the often  neglected  "black  box" 
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or conduct dimension  of  manufacturer-distributor exchanges,  specifically 
relating to  new  product behavior.  Scherer  (1980)  suggested that conduct 
has  not  received  adequate  research attention primari Iy  due  to the 
difficulty of  quantification and  the  lack  of  researcher  access to the 
requisite data.  This study  attempts to  remedy  both  of  these traditional 
constraints. 7 
Our  conduct model  impl ies that a  new  product's acceptance and, 
ultimately,  system efficiency and  performance,  is a  function first of 
manufacturer  and  distributor structure  (e.g.,  firm  numbers  and  size 
distribution),  including their organizational  characteristics  (e.g., 
chain  versus  wholesaler),  and  subsequently  of  the strategies and 
decision  making  procedures of  both  sets of  firms.  For  example, 
subsequent to the generation of  a  new  product  idea,  a  prototype  IS 
developed  and  modified  through  various  phases  of  R&D  activity and 
consumer  research  before an  initial  marketing strategy for  the  item  IS 
established  by  the manufacturer.  The  new  item  may  then  be  presented  to 
the buyer/intermediary.  Effectively,  the buyer  evaluates the  new 
product's  I ikely  demand  and  profit potential  (modeling  of  buyer's  judged 
profit potential  has  been  reported  in  McLaughl in  and  Rao)  based  on  the 
information  (e.g.,  marketing strategy)  presented  by  the manufacturer. 
The  strategy  variables typically  include price and  other  financial 
incentives  (e.g.,  margin  structure,  credit,  forward-buy  provisions), 
promotional  factors  (e.g.,  coupons,  in-store signage),  advertising 
campaigns,  various aspects  (e.g.,  taste,  appearance)  of  the  new  product 
and,  often,  certain  non-price  incentives  (e.g.,  free goods,  del ivery 
scheduling,  slotting allowances). 
A number  of  opportunities for  contact and  negotiation  between 
manufacturer  and  distributor occur  during this process:  distributors 
may  at times  initiate the  idea  of  developing  a  new  item  with  a 
manufacturer  based  on  perceived market demand;  manufacturers sometimes 
make  use  of  buyer  judgment  as  a  proxy  for  a  test market  or often share 
results of  any  preliminary test marketing for  retai ler  reaction; 
manufacturers frequently alter certain marketing  strategy  variables 8 
(especially  non-price  incentives)  based  upon  the suggestions made  by  the 
retai lers.  Thus  our  conceptual  model  depicts the critical  transmittal 
of  information  vertically,  between  manufacturer  and  retai ler 
(intermediary),  as  wei I  as the decision-making that takes place  internal 
to each  firm. 
Finally,  often after  repeated contacts with  the suppl ier,  the buyer 
makes  a  recommendation  to a  buying  committee.  This committee  normally 
consists  of  senior executives constituted to  represent the firm's 
diverse  interests.  The  buyin~ committee,  nearly always  acting  in 
accordance  with  the buyer's  recommendation,  makes  the final  decision. 
This paper  models  the  interaction between  manufacturer  and  retai ler 
(intermediary)  that  leads to the final  accept/reject decision. 
After  review  of  the above  literature and  numerous  meetings  with  the 
participating  intermediary  a  large  number  of factors  was  identified that 
appear  to  play  influential  roles  in  manufacturers'  new  product 
introductions to distributors.  In Table 1,  we  have  grouped  the relevant 
variables  into four  categories:  financial,  competition,  marketing 
strategy  and  other.  These  variables are,  in  effect,  both  the objective 
and  subjective measures  of  conduct--the give-and-take negotiation 
process--between manufacturer  and  distributor suggested  in  Figure 1. 
Further,  we  have  hypothesized  the direction of  influence of  each 
variable on  the  intermediary's decision to accept a  new  product;  the 
reasoning  behind  most  of  those  hypotheses  is straightforward.  However, 
brief explanations are provided  below. 
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We  hypothesize the gross margin  and  profit variables to be  only 
weakly  positive since although  high  profits are generally  viewed  by 
buyers as positive attributes,  sometimes  gross  profits are set at high 
levels only  to cover  required,  but perhaps  burdensome,  tasks to be 
performed  by  retai lers.  In  these  latter cases,  high  gross margins  (not 
profits)  may  negatively  influence  new  product acceptance.  Simi larly, 
high  profits may  indicate  high  prices that could  dampen  consumer  demand. 
Thus,  the sign  on  profits  is positive,  but with  a  question  mark  because 
of  the possible' high  prices associated with  high  profits.  Conversely, 
the sign on  gross margin  is positive but with  a  question  again,  this 
time because a  high  gross margin  may  not yield  a  high  profit. 
The  opportunity cost variable  is expected  to  have  a  negative 
influence  on  buyers'  likel ihood  to accept 'a  new  product the greater  the 
minimum  dol lars  required to order the product.  Competition  was  broken 
into two  parts:  firms  and  brands.  As  the  number  of  competing  firms  who 
already carry the  item  increased,  we  expected  a  positive relationship 
with  buyer  acceptance.  In essence,  a  vigi lant buyer  is  I ikely  to  be 
favorably  influenced  by  a  positive evaluation of  the  new  item  by  a 
competing  firm.  On  the other  hand,  we  hypothesized  that as the  number 
of  already existing  national  brands  and  private  label  products that 
competed  for  limited shelf space with  this  item  increased that the 
likelihood of  buyer  acceptance decreased. 
We  developed  a  series of  measures  to describe manufacturer 
marketing strategies.  Generally,  we  expected  positive relationships 
with  these strategy  variables  under  the control  of the vendor.  For 
example,  we  expected that as the score on  product  uniqueness  (that  IS,  a 
composite  variable combining  buyer  judgments of  product qual ity, 10 
performance  and  package  design)  increased that buyers  would  be  more 
likely to accept the product.  The  reasoning for  the other strategy 
variables was  simi lar  with  the exception  of  one  type of  trade variable, 
bi II  back  provisions.  Many  retailers find  it cumbersome  to  have  to 
Rbi  I I  back"  the manufacturer  for  allowances after having  compl ied  with 
certain  performance  requirements.  The  transaction costs of  the 
paperwork  are  not trivial.  Hence,  we  hypothesized that this particular 
term  of  trade would  negatively  influence acceptance. 
Finally,  new  products  in  fast growing  product categories are 
expected  to  be  accepted  with  higher  probabi lities by  channel 
intermediaries.  A new  item's synergy,  the association with  a  fami Iy of 
existing products,  is  hypothesized  to negatively  impact  acceptance 
probabi lity.  The  reasoning  here  again  was  based  on  physical  space 
limitation:  intermediaries are  less  likely to add  line extensions to 
already  existing products. 
Since the choice  variable  IS  dichotomous  (accept or  reject),  the 
acceptance  probabi I ity  for  a  new  product can  modeled  by  the fami liar 
logistic function: 
1 
P.  =  1  +  exp(-a  - b'X.)  J  _  -J 
(1) 
where: 
P.  = probabi I ity of  acceptance of  the j-th  item  by  the channel 
J  i ntermed i ary; 
x.  = (px1)  vector  of  descriptors measured  for  the j-th 
-J  item; 
b  = (px1)  vector  of  parameters;  and 
a  =  an  intercept term. 11 
The  logistic  regression model  in  equation  (1)  is estimated  by 
ma~imum  I ikelihood methods.  The  LOGIST  procedure developed  by  Walker 
and  Duncan  and  implemented  in  the SAS  package  (Harrel I)  is suitable for 
this purpose and  uti lized  here. 
Empirical  Study 
In  accordance with  our  conceptual  model  of manufacturer-distributor 
conduct,  data  were  collected from  a  large supermarket chain  chosen  to 
exemplify  the typical  organization for  evaluating  new  products.  The 
chain  is  publ icly  held,  covers a  large trading area  with  approximately 
100  stores  in  the Northeastern U.S.  and  its 1988  sales approached  $1 
bi I lion.  The  chain's headquarters  region  is one  frequently  employed  by 
manufacturers for test marketing  due  to the representativeness .of  its 
consumer  profi les and  market area.  It is  highly  unlikely  that any  food 
manufacturer  would  bypass  this firm  In  the  introduction  of  a  new 
product.  Hence,  although  the model  developed  here only  appl ies to one 
company,  the  representativeness of  the firm  may  permit a  cautious 
general ization of  the  results to other market  conditions. 
Two  types of  primary  data  were  collected from  the chain:  (a) 
vendor  supplied materials  including  product physical  characteristics 
(e.g.,  case cubic dimensions),  financial  information  (e.g.,  suggested 
retai I  price,  gross margin),  and  promotional  support  (e.g.,  television 
ads,  couponing),  and  (b)  a  one-page questionnaire completed  by  each 
buyer  assessing their  judgements  of  qual itative attributes  (e.g.,  taste, 
quality,  performance)  for  every  new  item.  Several  variables employed  In 
the model  were  computed  from  the data  (see Table 1).  The  data  were 12 
collected for  about 2,000  products  on  a  weekly  basis from  June,  1986  to 
February,  1987. 
Intermediary's Acceptance  Rates:  The  overal I  acceptance rate for  new 
products  presented to this chain  was  29.0~.  However,  significant 
variation exists  in  the  rates of  acceptance  by  product category  (e.g., 
at the extremes,  21~ for  canned  foods  to  61~ for  pet products)  and  by 
suggested  retai I  price of  the  item  (27~ for  items  priced  less than  Sl.00 
to  39~ for  items  over  $2.00).  Further,  consistent with  prior 
expectations,  acceptance  rate steadi Iy  grew  as the  levels of marketing 
or  promotional  support  (television advertising and  coupons)  increased: 
24~ of  products  with  no  promotional  support were  accepted,  41~ with 
limited  support  (either coupons  or TV)  and  46~ with  high  levels  (coupons 
and  TV)  of  promotional  support. 
Some  past studies  (e.g.,  Connor)  suggest that total  promotional 
support  is  I ikely  to be  highly correlated with  the size of  the firm 
offering the  new  product to the channel.  Unfortunately,  our  attempt to 
collect additional  data  on  manufacturer size,  using total  sales as a 
measure,  was  not completely successful,  due  in  major  part to the  large 
number  of  privately  held  firms  for  which  data  were  not  published. 
Nonetheless,  for  the avai lable data,  the acceptance rate was  41.3~ for 
firms  with  annual  sales over  $700  mi  I lion,  28.6~ for  firms  with sales 
between  $2  and  700  mi  I lion  and  29.2~ for  firms  with  sales  under  $2 
mi  I lion.  Thus  results from  past studies were  corroborated for  the 
largest firm  category  but were  less consistent for  the sma I ler firm 
categories. 13 
Analysis Method:  Unfortunately,  nearly  50~ of  the collected data  was 
not analyzed  in  this model  due  to  incompleteness of  some  of  the 
variables.  However,  a  sample  of  the product profi les from  the 
incomplete  data set was  analyzed  and  was  not significantly different 
from  the profi les  in  the complete data set.  The  complete  data  were 
divided  randomly  into two  subsamples  for  analysis and  validation;  the 
validation data  constituted about 1/3 of  the total  sample.  The  major 
analysis consisted of  bui Iding  logistic  regression models  for  al I 
categories of  items,  for  subgroups  of  items  with  several  levels  of 
marketing support and  for  groups  of  items  of  different price ranges. 
Analyses  for  subgroups  of  items  were  conducted  to account for  the 
inherent  heterogeneity  among  the various categories of  products.  In  al I 
of  these models,  the product category  variations are accounted  for  by  a 
set of  dummy  variables. 
RESULTS 
Structure and  Fit of  the Overal I  Model:  The  logistic  regression 
model  fits the data  extremely  wei  I.  The  predictive accuracy  exceeds 
78~,  much  higher  than that expected  by  chance.  Additionally,  the model 
correctly predicted  72~ of  the decisions  in  the validation sample. 
The  estimated coefficients for  the variables for  the  logistic model 
for  the total  analysis sample  are shown  in  Table 2.  The  model  chi-
square  is  highly significant.  Further,  the coefficients of  the majority 
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of  the variables are  in  the predicted direction.  The  variables of 
product  uniqueness,  expected category growth,  and  number  of  competing 14 
retai I  firms  show  positive and  significant effects.  The  variable bi I 1-
back  terms  of  trade shows  negative and  significant effect.  These 
results are according to our  hypotheses  for  the model.  The  only 
significant variable with  sign contrary to our  hypotheses  is gross 
margin  for  which  we  had  hypothesized  a  weak  positive relationship.  This 
finding  is consistent with  simi lar  results of Montgomery  (1975), 
however,  who  found  that the  relationship between  new  product acceptance 
and  gross margin  to  be  negative but  not significant.  The  only  other 
variables that appear  with  a  contradictory sign were  the  remaining  terms 
of  trade factors,  but their coefficients are  not statistically 
significant. 
Model  Structure for  Subgroups:  The  logistic model  was  also 
estimated for  subgroups  of  items--by marketing  support and  by  price. 
The  model  c2 statistics are-uniformly  high.  As  could  be  expected,  the 
classification accuracy  (not shown  here)  improved  for  the  various 
subgroups  of  items  (due  to greater  homogeneity  within a  subgroup).  For 
the sake  of  brevity,  only  the significant variables and  their direction 
are shown  in  Table 3  for  these subgroup  models. 
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The  subgroup  models  revealed  a  number  of differences from  the 
overal I  model.  First,  for  low  priced  items,  as the  intensity of  vendor 
effort and  profit per shelf  volume  Increase,  the probabi I ity of 
acceptance  increases.  Second,  for  medium  and  high  price  items,  gross 
margin,  vendor  effort,  and  profit per  volume  cease to have  significant 
influences  on  the accept/reject decision,  however,  both  product quality 15 
uniqueness  and  expected  category  growth  show  positive significant 
influences.  In addition,  the synergy  dummy  has  a  negative significant 
effect for  high  priced  items.  Third,  product  uniqueness  measure  is the 
only significant variable common  to both  highly  supported  and 
unsupported  items.  For  highly  supported  items,  opportunity  costs 
(negative),  expected  category  growth  (positive),  and  both  price dummies 
(negative)  are significant,  whi  Ie  for  unsupported  items,  gross  margin 
(negative),  number  of  competing  firms  (positive),  and  vendor  effort 
(positive)  are significant  indicators. 
There  is a  considerable variation  in  the acceptance of  new  products 
by  product category as  presented  in  Table 4.  In the sample  as a  whole, 
empirical  acceptance  rates are much  higher for  the categories of  candy 
and  gum,  sauces,  etc.,  and  snacks,  crackers and  nuts.  This table also 
shows  the estimated  probabi lities of  a  new  product acceptance for  items 
comparable  on  al I  aspects  but the product category for  al I  items  and  for 
each  subgroup  of  items.  These estimates were  calculated  uSing  a  base  of 
.33  for  the  "other"  category,  essentially to control  for  al I  aspects  of 
Insert Table 4  About  Here 
the  new  item  except the product category.  Thus,  they  indicate the 
"true"  differences among  the product categories.  These  data  show  that 
for!l!  items,  household  suppl ier and  dairy  foods  have  the  lowest 
acceptance  probabi lities and  items  from  candy  and  gum  group  have  the 
highest acceptances.  The  rankings of  categories changes  when  subgroups 
of  items are examined.  For  example,  for  the  highly  supported  items, 
dairy  foods  receive a  much  higher  acceptance whi  Ie candy  and  gum 
continue to enjoy  highest acceptance.  Other  interesting differences 
include a  nonmonotonic  relationship  between  acceptance  probabi I ity and 16 
price of  the  new  item  for  such  categories as frozen  foods,  canned  foods 
and  sauces,  spices,  etc. 
Finally,  the coefficients of  the models  by  firm size  (not shown 
here)  reveal  notable differences  in  the slotting allowance  variable. 
This  variable was  positive and  significant for  firms  with  total  sales 
under  $2  mi  I I ion  but negative and  significant for  firms  with  sales 
between  $100  mi  I I ion  and  $700  mi  I I ion.  Interestingly,  however,  it  IS 
insignificant for  firms  larger than  $700  mi  I I ion  in  sales. 
BUYER  ADAPTATION  TO  CONSUMER  (MARKET)  RESPONSE 
The  modeling  results  reported above  describe the  linkage between 
certain manufacturer strategies and  supermarket  buyer  acceptance. 
However,  to better  understand  the relationship of  the buyer  as  the 
channel  intermediary  between  the manufacturer  and  the consumer  (or 
marketplace),  additional  data  were  collected from  the participating 
retai I  firm  on  the status of  the subset of  al I  products accepted  from 
the original  set of  products  presented  by  vendors.  Table 5  reports the 
status for  these 549  products  (29  percent).  Out  of  the 549  accepted 
products,  31.9  percent  (175  products)  or 9.2  percent of  the original 
sample  presented,  were  sti I I  on  the retai I  shelves sel I ing  wei  I  nearly 
two  years after the  initial  vendor  presentation.  Although  69.1  percent 
of  the products  initially accepted  by  the buying  organization  were 
discontinued  within the first two  years,  buyers  reported  a  variety of 
reasons for  this deletion decision.  The  three categories buyers most 
often cited were  lack  of  consumer  interest  (45.3  percent of  al I 
deletions),  expiration of  manufacturer  introductory  allowances  (12.9 17 
percent)  and  the  introduction  of  a  superior competiting  item  (11.5 
percent). 
Table 5  also shows  the profi Ie  of  attributes present  in  the set of 
products  initially accepted  by  the buying  committee  as  compared  to the 
profi Ie of attributes  (varibles)  of  the products that had  ultimately 
1  been  "accepted"  by  consumers  (or  by  the market)  after two  years.  These 
comparisons  show  numerous  differences  between  the attributes present  In 
the group  of  products accepted  by  the buyer/intermediaries  (buyer 
acceptance)  and  the group  of  products  ultimately  accepted  by  the 
marketplace  (consumer  acceptance).  The  last column  in  Table 5  is an 
index  of the approximate efficiency with  which  the buying  committee  was 
able to predict consumer  acceptance computed  as the  ratio of  percent of 
products  accepted  by  the buying  committee  and  the percent of  products 
"accepted"  by  consumers  in  the marketplace  (after two  years).  Thus, 
this ratio  is an  approximate  measure  of  the degree to which  the  buying 
committee  (in the  role of  an  agent for  consumers)  and  consumers  evaluate 
new  products  in  an  equivalent manner.  A score of  1.00  indicates that 
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buyers  were  able to perfectly anticipate consumer's final  judgment  with 
respect to the  importance of  the selected attribute.  An  index  greater 
(less)  than  1.00 suggests that buyers  "overestimated"  ("underestimated") 
the  importance  of  an  attribute,  at  least as  determined  by  the proportion 
of  al I  the products  ultimately accepted  by  the marketplace that exhibit 
this attribute.  For  example,  of  al I  products accepted  by  the buying 
committee,  21.7 percent had  test market  results presented to  buyers  as  a 
part of  vendors'  new  product presentation,  however,  28 .0  percent of  the 18 
successful  products  (i .e., sti I I  on  shelves after two  years)  were  those 
that had  had  such  test market  results originally presented.  The 
resulting  index,  .78,  suggests that buyers  underestimated  the  importance 
of test market  results  in  determining  ultimate marketplace success. 
The  attributes for  which  the  index  is either very  large or  very 
smal I  are pictorially shown  in  Figure 2.  For  example,  products given 
Insert Figure 2  About  Here 
high  scores on  product  uniqueness  by  buyers  do  not  necessari Iy  gain 
consumer  acceptance to the same  degree  (the  index  is 1.24 showing  the 
possible  inefficiency of  the buying  committee  to predict consumer 
acceptance). 
SYSTEMWIDE  EFFICIENCY  IMPLICATIONS 
The  model  in  this paper  estimated the  importance  of  the  various 
components  of  a  manufacturer's  new  product strategy  in  determining  the 
acceptance of  a  new  product  by  an  individual  supermarket  intermediary. 
The  statistical  results are significant and  the explanatory  variables 
behaved  generally as predicted.  With  knowledge  of  manufacturer  new 
product  budgets,  calculation of  marginal  returns associated with  various 
marketing  mix  factors  becomes  straightforward and  optimum  levels of 
manufacturer  expenditures can  be  determined.  Consequently,  systemwide 
efficiency  increases:  theoretically,  costs are more  optimally 
al located,  profits can  be  higher for  channel  members  and  at the same 
time  prices can  be  lower  for  consumers. 
The  lack  of  significant positive effects of certain terms of  trade 
(e.g. ,  slotting allowance  and  free cases)  and,  indeed,  the significant 19 
negative effect of  others  (e.g.,  bi I I  back  provisions)  have  several 
impl ications for  total  food  system efficiency.  Although  this result 
appears contrary  to certain of  our  conduct-model's  prior expectations 
and  contrary  to much  popular  industry  perception  (see,  for  example, 
Supermarket  News  and  New  York  Times),  a  possible  hypothesis  is that the 
presence of  certain  non-price  incentives,  I ike slotting allowances,  may 
actually  be  correlated with  inferior  products.  That  is,  suppl iers may 
offer additional  support for  products  they  fear  are  not truly  unique 
and,  simi larly,  buyers  may  indeed  recognize and  accept truly superior 
products  on  their own  merits without  requiring additional  inducements. 
In fact,  when  the buyers  in  the participating retai I  firm  were 
confronted  with this  initially puzzling  result,  they  corroborated  that 
our  hypothesis accurately  described  typical  industry  practice. 
Moreover,  the attribute profi Ie  of  products that had  withstood  the test 
of  the marketplace--those sel ling  wei I  after two  years--suggests that 
buyers  apparently  "overestimated"  the  importance  of  the slotting 
allowances  (index =  1.38).  The  index  indicates that a  considerably 
sma I ler  proportion  of  products that had  slotting allowances  were 
accepted  by  consumers  than  were  initially accepted  by  buyers.  This 
finding  also suggests that buyers  may  initially accept  products that are 
accompanied  by  slotting allowances,  perhaps  due  to the financial 
incentive alone,  only  to discontinue them  relatively sooner  than 
competing  new  items  without allowances. 
Thus  the  impl ication  is that much  of  the  large and  currently 
expanding  manufacturer  promotional  allowances directed to the retai I 
trade may  be  inefficient  if  not  redundant.  This  study  indicates that 
manufacturers may  be  better off  by  real locating some  of  their  new 20 
product  budgets  into activities more  likely to positively  influence 
buyers  and  consumers  both.  However,  this  is not an  easy  prescription 
because,  as this analyisis has  shown,  several  of  the strategy  variables 
the most  influential  to buyers  (e.g.,  product  uniqueness  and  category 
growth)  are apparently  not weighted  as  heavi Iy  by  consumers.  That  IS, 
retai I  buyers  make  new  product decisions,  at  least  in  part,  on  a 
different set of criteria than  consumers.  Better prediction  by  retai I 
buyers  of  their  own  consumers  ultimate product preference  is  I ikely  to 
increase  both  firm  (and  system)  efficiency  by  moving  the firm  (and 
industry)  to an  improved  position(s)  on  its production function(s). 
Data  collection efforts  in  this research  were  somewhat 
disappointing  in  one  sense,  as  various  pieces of  information  were 
missing  (e.g.,  number  of  coupons,  dollar amounts  of advertising,  etc.) 
for  a  large  number  of  items.  This  is not just a  researcher  problem;  it 
is also  a  problem  for  channel  intermediaries  in  their actual  decision-
making  environments.  It appears  likely that  information  from  vendors 
could  be  much  improved  by  including,  perhaps even  standardizing, 
advertising and  promotional  materials,  the format  for  discounting 
schedules,  etc.,  in  new  product packets.  Although  some  vendors  may  not 
initially embrace  such  a  proposal  due  to feared  loss of  competitive 
advantage,  overal I  results would  undoubtedly  eliminate dupl ication and 
waste  thus  increasing the efficiency of  the entire system. 
Finally,  since our  data  show  that a  higher  percentage of  products 
were  accepted  when  market  research  results were  presented  (39  percent of 
products  with  test marketing  or  marketing  research  results were  accepted 
versus 28  percent acceptance  rate for  products without these  results) 
one  could  hypothesize that,  given  the high  marketing  costs of test 
marketing  a  new  item  with  consumers,  manufacturers  instead  simply 21 
introduce the  item  to the buyer  first.  In effect,  the buyer,  frequently 
in  a  better position to assess  likely consumer  demand  than  a 
manufacturer,  may  serve as a  quick  and  inexpensive market test.  In this 
sense,  recent  large  numbers  of  new  product  introductions may  not 
represent  inefficient product proliferation,  but an  efficient 
manufacturer strategy to  increase variety  (and  profit)  whi  Ie  reducing 
systemwide costs. 
Conclusions  and  Future Research 
Although  new  product  introductions  have  been  widely  cited as  one  of 
the major  modes  of  conduct  by  grocery  manufacturers,  new  products are 
likely  to  be  an  equally  important strategic tool  of distributors as 
wei  I.  Yet  little research  has  probed  the conduct  of  the  retai I  buying 
teams,  gatekeepers to the supermarket shelves,  regarding  how  they  decide 
to accept or  reject the growing  number  of  new  product offerings.  We  are 
encouraged,  based  on  this  research  experience with  one  company,  that a 
richer complement  of  conduct or strategic variables can  be  incorporated 
into economic  analysis to  improve  understanding of,  and  ultimately after 
further  val idation  with  other firms,  to  improve  systemwide  efficiency 
and  performance.  Further  investigation  is warranted  into the finding 
only  suggested  in  this  research that buyers  and  consumers  may  use 
different sets of  varaibles  in  evaluating  new  products. 
One  obvious direction of  future  research  is to  repl icate this 
research  to additional  firms  to  probe  such  questions as:  Why  do  certain 
firms  chose particular organizational  forms  to evaluate  new  products?; 
What  is the  impact  of  these other forms  (e.g.,  no  committee)  on  the 
acceptance  rates?;  Whether  some  forms  are more  (less)  efficient or more 
(less)  beneficial  for  producers or  consumers  and  to  identify which 22 
organizational  forms  enhance  the success of  manufacturer strategies.  It 
might  be  shown,  for  example,  that a  reorganization of  a  distributor's 
buying  process could  result  in  lowering  a  firm's transaction costs and  a 
probable  improvement  In  system welfare. 
Simi larly,  certain  intermediary organizations which  evaluate  new 
products exist  in  other channels  (e.g.,  book  stores and  movie  theaters) 
where  many  of  the problems  of  new  product selection decisions are 
paral lei  to the grocery  channel.  The  existing firms  in  the grocery 
product system  which  track  new  product  introductions  (e.g.,  Marketing 
Intelligence Service,  Ltd.,  and  Gorman)  do  not  provide adequate 
information  idiosyncratic to each  buyer's decision.  Thus,  opportunities 
exist for  conducting comparative studies of  the services of  the 
information  intermediaries for  non-grocery  product channels;  the  results 
may  suggest opportunities for  improving  the efficiency of  the grocery 
product channels. 
An  ideal  next step  in  this research  stream  is to develop  a  societal 
balance sheet of  costs and  benefits due  to the  new  product  introduction 
activity  in  the food  system.  Various measurement  questions arise  In 
this endeavor.  From  the manufacturer's  perspective,  not only  are 
assessments  of costs of  R&D  and  marketing effort needed,  but also the 
opportunity costs of  false  introductions and  early dismissal  of  likely 
successes  need  to  be  evaluated.  Further,  the  importance of  new  products 
for  the  viabi I ity of  the firms  needs  to be  measured  in  monetary  terms. 
Simi lar costs and  benefits can  be  identified at the  intermediary  level. 
Whi  Ie  one  can  debate the existence of  any  consumer  benefits at al I  from 
new  product  prol iferation,  there appear  to be  ample  research 
opportunities to  increase the efficiency of  the process. 23 
Footnotes 
1.  A logistic  regression  model  was  also developed  to examine  the 
abi I ity of  the same  set of  varibles  used  in  Table 2  for  predicting 
the status  (consumer  acceptance)  of  the accepted  products after two 
years.  This model  predicted correctly 73.5  percent of  the time 
(less than  the buyer  acceptance model)  and  there was  no  overlap 
between  the  two  sets of  significant variables. FIGURE 1.  CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO NEW PRODUCT CONDUCT1 
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• Figure 2 
INDEX  OF  RELATIVE  FACTOR  IMPORTANCE 
BUYER  VS.  CONSUMER 
Househld  Supp ..  57 ••••  _. 
Candy  and  Sum  \  1.84 
Beverages  ••••••••••••••  2.05 
Dairy  Foods 
Cat.  Growth>  = 5 
Cat.  Growth  < = 5 
Unigueness  ~ 15 
Uniqueness  13-14 
Uniqueness  ~ 12 
Factor' other  firms  = > 6 
,  other  firms  = 1-6 
i  other  firms  = 0 
Sr.  ~argin > 241 
Sr.  Margin  141-241 
Sr.  Margin  < 141 
OpP.  Cost> $10,000 
Opp.  Cost  $1k-l0k 
Opp.  Cost  < $1,000 
Bill  Back 
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(Qual ity and  Package) 
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TERM  OF  TRADE 
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S profit per  cu. 
ft.  of  shelf 
volume 
Dol lars needed  to 
meet  min.  order 
quantity 
Actual  buyer 
determination 
of  numbers  of 
firms  and  brands 
Buyer  judgments 
on  0-10  scales 
(sum) 
Buyer  judgments 
on  0-10  scales 
(sum) 
Three  categories 
--no,  partial  and 
high  support 
Dunvny  variables 
Two  dUImlY 
variables for  low 
and  medium  prices 
Index  of  buyer 
judgments  on  0-10 
scales 
Whether  item  is a 
member  of  a 
fami  Iy  (0,1) 
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Influence on 
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Pos i t i ve  (?) 
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Negat i ve 27 
Table 2 
RESULTS  OF  LOGISTIC  REGRESSION  FOR  TOTAL  SAMPLE 
(ACCEPTjREJECT  DECISIONS) 
GROUP  OF  ITEMS 
VARIABLE 
INTERCEPT 
ALL  ITEMS 
-5.47(41.92)* 
GROSS  MARGIN  -0.06(10.30)* 
PROFIT  PER  SHELF  VOLUME  0.004(3.24)+ 
OPPORTUNITY  COST  -0.001(1.14)+ 
-------------------------------------------------------------
NUMBER  OF  COMPETING  FIRMS  0.14(11.72l*+ 
NUMBER  OF  COMPETING  BRANDS  -0.03(1.89) 
PRODUCT  UNIQUENESS  (QUALITY) 
VENDOR  EFFORT  a 
TERMS  OF  TRADE  DUMMIES: 
OFF-INVOICE 
SLOTTING  ALLOWANCE 
BILL  BACK 
FREE  CASES 
LOW  PRICE  DUMMY 
MEDIUM  PRICE  DUMMY 
EXPECTED  CATEGORY  GROWTH 
SYNERGY  DUMMY 
PRODUCT  CATEGORY  DUMMIESb 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS 












(NOT  SHOWN) 
687 
249.49,  23 
0.0 
NOTE:  ENTRIES  ARE  COEFFICIENT  AND  CHI-SQUARE  FOR  EACH  VARIABLE 
(with  1  d.f.) 
* Significant at 0.05  level. 
+  Sign  of  the coefficient  is according  to expectations. 
a  The  marketing  support variable  is  in  this buyer  judgmental  variable. 
b The  relative differences on  estimated  acceptance  probabi I ity  of 
product categories are shown  in  Table 4. s...oon.p 
OF  mMS 
Low  Priced 
Items  ~ $1.00 
Med i  lJtl  Pr i  ced 
Items  $1.00 -
$2.00 
High  Priced Items 
2 $2.00 
Unsupported  Items 
High I  y Supported 
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Table 3 
SIGNIFICANT  VARIABLES  FOR  LOGISTIC  REGRESSION 
FOR  SELECTED  SUBGROUPS  OF  ITEMS 
(ACCEPT/REJECT  DECISIONS) 
SIOOFICANT  SIGN  OF  N.J.B:R  OF 
VAAIAB....ES  R8.ATIOOiIP  OOSffiVATIIJ5 
Gross  Margin  Z37 
Profit/Shelf Volume  + 
Vendor  Effort  + 
NlJTber  of ~  i  ng  Fi nTIS  +  289 
Product Un i  queness  + 
Slotting Allowances 
Bi II Back 
Expected  Category  Growth  + 
Nurber  of Carpet i  ng  Fi nTIS  +  161 
Product Un i  queness  + 
Expected  Category  Growth  + 
Synergy  Dunny 
Gross  Margin  194 
NutDer  of ~i  ng  Fi nTIS  + 
Product Un i  queness  + 
Vendor  Effort  + 
Opportun i  ty Cost  155 
Product Un i  queness  + 
Low  Pr i  ce Dunny 
Med i  lJtl  Pr i  ce  DlJTIl1)' 
Expected  Category  Growth  + 
t.roEL 
ocr  -SQJ6RE; 
D-F  I  P-V.ALLE 
90.61;  21 
0.0 
128.00;  21 
0.0 
117.75;  21 
0.0 
120.87;  Z3 
0.0 
95.61;  Z3 
0.0 
Note:  Pr i  ~  var i ab I  e  was  descr i  bed  by  three categor i  es shown  above  and  dlJTll1)'  var i  ab I  es 
were  used  in  the rrodel  for the  low  and  medilJtl  categories. Table  4 
PRODUCT  CATEGORY  SPECIFIC  PROBABILITIES 
IN THE  LOGISTIC  YODELS  OF  ACCEPT/REJECT  DECISIONS 
-.------
Illustrative Acceptance Probabilities for  Comparable  Items For 
EllPIRICAL  HIGHLY  LOW  llEDIUll  HIGH 
ACCEPTANCE  UNSUPPORTED  SUPPORTED  PRICED  PRICED  PRICED 
PRODUCT  CATEGORIES  RATE  (~)  ALL  ITEllS  ITEMS  ITEllS  ITEU:S  ITEllS  ITEUS 
FROZEN  FOODS  33.0  0.133  0.011  0.084  0.396  0.036  0.084 
CANNED  FOODS  21.1  0.208  0.063  0.411  0.463  0.096  0 . 610 
DAIRY  FOODS  28.0  0.098  0.002  0.463  0.228  0.010  0.080 
BEVERAGES  28.3  0.112  0.296  0.000·  0.000·  0.180  0.096 
HOUSEHOLD  SUPPLIES  29.1  0.066  0.006  0.000·  0.024  0.036  0.018 
SAUCES,  SPICES,  ~ 
CONDIllENTS,  OILS,  43.8  0.174  0.147  0.397  0.660  0.040  0.461  CO 
DRESSINGS 
CANDY  ..  GUll  43.4  0.390  0.063  0.772  0.606  0.143  0.244 
SNACKS,  CRACKERS  43.4  0.166  0.069  0.110  0.001  0.112  0.086 
.. NUTS 
OTHERS  28.2  0.330  0.330  0.330  0.330  0.330  0.330 
.Theae  eatimates are ver7  cloae to .ero due  to  a  very  large  (but  insignificant)  coefficient for the  dummy  variable of  the 
corre.ponding product category. 30 
Table  5 
COMPARI SON OF  PROFILES  OF  NEW  PRODUCTS  ACCEPTED  BY  BUYING 
COMMITTEE  VERSUS  ACCEPTED  BY  CONSUMERS  (MARKETPLACE),  TWO  YEARS 
AFTER  INTRODUCTION,  BY  MAJOR  ATTRIBUTE 
Index  of 
Buy i  ng  Cann i  ttee 
Products  Buying  Consuner  Acceptance  to 
Variable/  Introduced  Cannittee  (Market)  ConslJller 
Attribute  Total  Acceptance  Acceptance  Acceptance 
Nurber  of  Products  1899  649  (29.~  175  (31. 9'A)  0.91 
Test Market  Results  YES  322  21.~  28.<1,;  0.78 
NO  1fiT7  78.3  72.0  1.09 
Market  Research  YES  642  46.3  46.3  1.00 
NO  1257  53.7  53.7  1.00 
Terms  of  Trade 
Slotting Allowance  YES  258  14.2  10.3  1.38 
NO  1641  85.8  89.7  0.96 
Off  Invo i  ce A  I lowance  YES  1186  68.5  70.3  0.97 
NO  713  31.5  29.7  1.00 
Free  Cases  YES  501  ']J.9  ro.9  0.00 
NO  1398  72.1  69.1  1.04 
Bi II Back  YES  ~  8.9  10.9  0.82 
NO  1695  91.1  89.1  1.02 
Financial 
Profit/Cube  <=  $3.00  1218  56.1  61.1  0.92 
Profit/Cube >  $3.00  681  43.9  38.9  1.13 
Opportun i  ty  Cost <  $1(0)  1101  64.3  65.7  0.98 
Opp.  Cost $1(0) - $10, (0)  596  25.1  20.0  1.26 
Opp.  Cost > $10,(0)  202  10.6  14.3  0.74 
Gross  Marg i  n <  14~  403  18.8  20.0  0.94 
Gross  Margin  14~ - 24~  441  ']J.9  27.4  1.02 
Gross  Margin >  24~  1~  53.4  52.6  1.02 
Carpeti~ion 
,  Carpeting  Firms =  0  984  50.5  45.7  1.10 
,  Carpeting  Firms =  1 - 6  367  18.9  21.7  0.87 
f Carpeting  Firms> 6  647  ~.6  32.6  0.94 
,  Carpet i  ng  Brands =  0  975  58.7  57.1  1.03 
f  ~ing  Brands  > 5  924  41.4  42.9  0.96 31 
Table 5  (continued) 
Index  of 
Buy i  ng  Cann i  ttee 
Products  Buying  Consuner  Acceptance  to 
Variable/  Introduced  Cannittee  (Market)  Consurer 
Attribute  Total  Acceptance  Acceptance  Acceptance 
Product Character i  st  i  cs 
lkl i  queness  <=  12  1159  39.0  36.6  1.07 
lkl i  queness 13  - 14  449  32.6  40.6  0.00 
lkl i  queness  >=  15  291  28.4  22.9  1.24 
Vendor  Effort <=  10  1039  35.3  34.9  1.01 
Vendor  Effort 11  - 13  604  37.5  35.4  1.06 
Vendor  Effort >=  14  256  27.1  29.7  0.91 
Retai I Price <  $1  fro  36.8  39.4  0.93 
Retai I Price $1  - S2  648  33.5  37.7  0.89 
Retai I Price> S2  421  29.7  22.9  1.~ 
Categ.  Growth  <=  5  848  17.5  14.3  1.22 
Categ.  Growth  >=  6  1~1  82.5  85.7  0.96 
Synergy  YES  1071  SO.8  52.0  0.98 
~  828  49.2  48.0  1.02 
Product Categor i  es : 
Frozen  Foods  385  22.5  26.4  0.85 
Canned  Foods  241  8.2  8.1  1.02 
Dairy  Foods  'XJ7  8.2  10.3  0.00 
Beverages  184  8.2  4.0  2.~ 
I-buseho I  d Supp lies  110  4.6  8.1  0.57 
Sauces,  Sp ices,  Etc.  104  7.1  5.8  1.24 
Candy  1 Gun  116  9.5  5.2  1.84 
Snacks,  Crackers,  Etc.  87  3.3  4.0  0.82 
Other  700  28.3  28.2  1.01 32 
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